



Canadian Defence
& Foreign Affairs
Institute



THE DOMINION
INSTITUTE

VISIONS OF CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY

Revised Conference Report

Prepared by Innovative Research
Group, Inc.

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1. Introduction

The Canadian government is in the midst of the first major foreign policy review of the new Millennium. This study was commissioned to provide a benchmark of Canadians' level of engagement and basic orientations towards foreign policy as well as to explore the Canadian public's reaction to a number of competing visions for Canada's foreign policy future and foreign policy choices. We believe it provide an important snapshot of Canadian views on their place in the world at an important time.

The Dominion Institute of Canada and the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute commissioned this survey for the upcoming conference Defining the National Interest: New Directions for Canadian Foreign Policy. The conference will be hosted by the Centre for Security and Defence Studies, the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, the Centre for International Relations and l'Institut québécois des hautes études internationales at the Lord Elgin Hotel in Ottawa on November 4th and 5th, 2004

This is a revised version of the preliminary report prepared for use at Defining the National Interest: New Directions for Canadian Foreign Policy conference. A final report will be available at the Innovative Research Group, Inc.'s web site -

<http://www.innovativeresearch.ca>

Innovative Research Group, Inc., a Toronto-based research firm, is pleased to present the results from survey of 500 randomly selected Canadians. The survey was conducted between Thursday, October 21st and Thursday, October 28th and has a margin of error of +/- 4.38%, 19 times out of 20.

The survey covers 7 major topics.

1. Public engagement: We explore Canadian's expressed interest in international events, their knowledge of basic foreign policy facts, and their sense of whether world events make a difference in their lives and whether or not foreign policy is best left to the experts.
2. The Context: We ask Canada their views on Canada's past role in world affairs, whether Canada is getting stronger or weaker in terms of making a difference, and briefly explore the implications of the HMCS Chicoutimi fire.
3. General Foreign Policy Orientations: We ask Canadians whether it is better for Canada to play an active part in the world or not as well as explore attitudes towards the United States, promoting Canadian values, the impact of our changing demographics and whether power still comes from the barrel of a gun.

4. Visions of the Future: Drawing from the summary of visions in Jennifer Welsh's book, *Canada At Home in the World*, we test Canadian reactions to six competing visions for Canadian foreign policy.
5. Threats: Drawing upon the quadrennial studies of the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, we ask Canadians to rate their degree of concern regarding seven potential international threats.
6. Willingness to Use Force: Again, drawing upon the quadrennial studies of the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, we test where Canadians really stand in their willingness to use the military as a foreign policy tool and compare those results to findings from 6 other advanced industrial economies.
7. Choices: Finally, we look at four key foreign policy choices drawn from diplomacy, development and defence.

We find a country deeply interested in foreign policy, watching the Chicoutimi story closely, but with limited knowledge of key foreign policy facts.

Canadians are strongly oriented toward taking an active role on the world stage. It's a country that firmly believes it has played a major role in the significant world events of the past 75 years. While there is no consensus among the general public on whether Canada is becoming stronger or weaker internationally, those who are most knowledgeable are most concerned we are losing ground in terms of our influence.

While Canadians still more likely to believe the US is force for good rather than a force for evil, there is a Canadian consensus that the US is acting like a rogue nation, rushing into conflicts without first working with friends and allies to find other solutions. A bare majority of Canadians (51%) also don't trust the U.S. to treat Canadian concerns fairly.

Canadians are not convinced of the appropriateness of promoting Canadian values abroad. While a narrow majority of 55% agree that Canada should promote our aboriginal policies as a model for the world, four out of five Canadians agree it is wrong for any country, even Canada, to push its values on other countries.

Canadians are divided over whether power today still comes from the barrel of a gun but they narrowly agree that the increasing number of Asians in our country should result in Canada paying more attention to Asian countries.

Fear of potential epidemics like SARS and AIDS is Canada's top concern from a list of seven international threats. Global warming and international terrorism joined potential epidemics on the list of threats that most Canadians ranked as being of critical concern.

Four other potential threats including globalization, Islamic fundamentalism, immigrants and refugees and US aggression towards Canada were rated as critical threats by less than 30% of Canadians.

Canadians are willing to commit Canadian troops in a wide array of scenarios, even when there is a chance some members of the military may be killed and no Canadian lives or direct interests are at risk.

The only scenario we tested where Canadians showed any significant reluctance to commit troops was to secure the supply of oil, and even in that case 47% of Canadians were prepared to commit Canadian troops.

Moreover, despite the stereotypes of the pacifist Canadian public and the belligerent Americans, Canadians are very similar to Americans in our willingness to commit the military. It appears the main difference between Americans and Canadians when it comes to committing troops is not Canadian commitment but Canadian capability.

When it comes to choices in foreign aid and diplomacy, Canadians show a willingness to focus foreign aid on fewer countries to create a bigger impact, but they are reluctant to shift resources away from the UN either to focus on important countries or to alternative regional multi-lateral organizations.

Looking to the future, we see a mixed story. Canadians strongly embrace both the interest-based approach of foreign policy as trade relations and the values-based approach of soft power. However, whether the government adopts an interest-based approach or a values-based approach, Canadians do not appear to be prepared to sacrifice domestic priorities for the greater international good.

2. Public Engagement

If we are going to consider the Canadian public's views on foreign policy, it is important to have some understanding of where foreign policy fits in their everyday lives. To that end, we asked Canadians about:

- Their level of interest in international issues and events;
- Their knowledge of 3 basic facts in defence, development and diplomacy; and
- Their attitudes towards the impact of world events in their lives and their willingness to leave foreign policy to the experts.

Interest

Canadians express a great deal of interest in international affairs. 88% report being interested in events or issues on the international scene with 43% saying they are very interested. This is actually a little higher than Martin and Fortmann reported in their review of Canadian interest in international affairs in 2001.

It comes as no surprise to see that Canadians who know more facts about international affairs are more interested. Three quarters of those knowing all three facts tested said they have a high level of interest, just over half of those knowing two of the three facts had a high level of interest and four in ten of those knowing one fact had a high level of interest.

Other groups more likely to say they are very interested include higher income Canadians (54%), Canadians over 55 (52%), men (51%) and especially men out of the workforce (58%). First and second generation Canadians are also slightly more likely to express high levels of interest than Canadians from families that have been here more than two generations.




Figure 1 - Interest

Knowledge

Despite the avowed interest of Canadians in international affairs, they have a limited knowledge of key facts. We asked Canadians to identify three facts about international affairs, one each for development, diplomacy and defence. For development we asked Canadians to name the rock star that spoke at the federal Liberal leadership convention and called for Paul Martin to assist third world countries. For diplomacy we asked people to name the Canadian Prime Minister who received the Nobel Peace Prize. And for defence we told respondents that Canada sent 850 combat troops to fight alongside the United States and other allies in the war against terrorism and asked them to name the country to which those troops were sent.

Just 28% could name Lester Pearson as the Prime Minister who won the Nobel Peace Prize.

One third (33%) could name Bono as the rock star at the Liberal convention.

Just over half (54%) could name Afghanistan as the country to which we sent 850 soldiers in February 2002.

In summary, 11% of the public could volunteer all three facts, 27% could name two of the three, 29% knew only one of the three and one third could not correctly answer a single knowledge question.

Women (49%) are far more likely than men (17%) to be unable to answer any of the fact questions correctly. Higher income Canadians are more knowledgeable than lower income Canadians, but the main differences in knowledge are related to interest as discussed in the interest section. However, among those who say they are very interested, 29% knew only one fact and 20% could not provide a single correct answer.




Figure 2 – Awareness of International Affairs Facts

Engagement Attitudes

While Canadians believe the world outside our borders has a significant impact on their daily life, they have mixed views as to whether we are better off leaving foreign policy to the experts.

Three quarters of Canadians reject the idea that “What happens in the rest of the world really doesn’t make much of a difference to me in my daily life”. Half the country strongly rejects that premise. Only 24% agree.

Francophones (31%), Quebecois (30%), Canadians over 55 (30%) and lower income Canadians (31%) are more likely to agree what happens in the rest of the world really doesn’t matter to me. Working women are far more likely to disagree (83%) than non-working women or men as are very interested (84%) and highly knowledgeable (87%) Canadians.




Figure 3 – Engagement Attitudes

The public is much more open to the idea of delegating foreign policy. Canadians are almost evenly divided when we ask them whether “Foreign policy is so complicated that it is best to leave it to the experts. While just over half (51%) disagree, 46% agree with leaving foreign policy to the experts. Very few Canadians are on the fence on that question.

Higher income people tend to disagree with this statement (66% disagree) while lower income respondents agree (58% agree). Women marginally agree (50% agree) while men disagree (55% disagree). Staying true to their populist roots, Westerners strongly disagree (62%) that foreign policy should be left to experts while Quebecois tend to agree (54% agree) as do Atlantic residents (64% agree). Consistently, Anglophones tend to disagree (55% disagree) while Francophones tend to agree (54% agree).

Interest and knowledge also play an important role on this question. The more interest and knowledge people have, the more likely they are to disagree. Over six in ten (63%) very interested respondents disagree, as do seven in ten highly knowledgeable respondents.

3. How is Canada doing so far?

Looking back

Almost 4 out of 5 Canadians agree “Canada has played an important role in critical world events over the past 75 years”.




Figure 4 – The Rearview Mirror

While strong majorities among all groups of Canadians agree with this statement, young people are significantly less likely to agree (25% disagree to 69% agree). Working women are also somewhat more resistant to this bandwagon with 23% disagreement.

Knowledge also makes a significant difference in this question. The more you know, the more you are likely to agree. While one in four (24%) of Canadians who were not able to answer any of the knowledge questions disagreed, nine out of ten of those with the highest knowledge levels agreed Canada has played an important role.

The Current Trend

How is Canada doing in terms of our ability to make a difference in the world?

The most common answer from Canadians (44%) is that they see no change in Canada’s ability to make a difference in the world.




Figure 5 – Making a Difference in the World

Among those who see a difference, Canadians are generally divided. Just under three in ten (29%) say we are getting weaker while slightly fewer (23%) say we are getting stronger.

Higher income Canadians are more likely (34%) to say we are getting weaker as are men (35%), those over 55 (35%) and Ontarians (33%).

Knowledge makes a big difference on this question. Those who know the most are much more likely to say Canada is getting weaker (42%).

Implications of the HMCS Chicoutimi

Nine in ten Canadians are aware of the fire on the HMCS Chicoutimi. This is an extremely high level of awareness and has only been exceeded in our experience by issues like SARS at its peak or the controversy over the skating gold medal at the Salt Lake City Olympics.

People under 35 are somewhat less likely to be aware of the Chicoutimi fire (25-34 = 86%, under 25 = 76%). Men (94%) are slightly more likely to be aware than women (86%). Francophones (95%) are paying slightly more attention than Anglophones (89%). Even among the relatively few Canadians who say they are not interested in events or issues on the international scene, 88% are aware of the fire.




Figure 6 – Awareness of fire on Canadian submarine

A bare majority of Canadians say that the fire is a symptom of deeper problems in the military and NOT a unique accident. However, more than one in three (37%) say it was just an accident, and not a sign of other problems.

More than six in ten higher income Canadians say the fire is a symptom of deeper problems while close to seven in ten self-employed Canadians believe the same.

People who follow international events closely are much more likely to say the fire reflects deeper problems than those who pay less attention.

Men (41%) are more likely to say it was a unique accident than women (33%) while women are more likely to be uncertain.

Older Canadians are less likely to say the fire is a symptom of deeper problems and more likely to say they are unsure. Canadians who have limited knowledge of foreign affairs follow the same pattern.

Anglophones and Francophones have similar views on this measure.

The HMCS Chicoutimi has primed Canadians both to be more interested in discussions of military policy and more sceptical of the existing policy.

4. General foreign policy attitudes

To help ground our discussion of foreign policy in the future, we wanted to get some reaction to some of Canadians' underlying orientations towards key elements of foreign policy. We asked about:

- Canadians general appetite for engagement with world affairs,
- Feelings regarding the United States,
- Projecting Canadian values,
- The importance of military power, and
- The impact of our changing ethnic make-up.

General Orientation

The first and most basic orientation we explored is our appetite for international engagement. Do Canadians believe Canada should play an active part in world, or would they rather stay out of world affairs?

While we did not find a Canadian measure of this orientation to give us a sense of how Canadian attitudes may be evolving over time, we were able to find a measure used internationally. The question we used in this survey originates from the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations Quadrennial Study of U.S. public opinion on Foreign Policy. In 2002, this was asked not only in the U.S., but in six European countries as well. The link to the CCFR site is <http://www.ccfrr.org/>.




Figure 7 - International Views On International Activism

As it turns out, Canadians prefer to engagement with the world rather than staying out of world affairs by a three to one margin. In this we are really not much different than most other Western Democracies. The Germans are about 10 points more reluctant to engage with the world, while the French are 10 points more enthusiastic. The Americans lean a little towards the Germans while the British lean towards the French. Other middle powers like Poland and the Netherlands are right around where we stand.

Attitudes towards the United States

Relations with the United States, our continental neighbour and predominant trading partners, are fundamental to our foreign policy stance. While whole books have been written on similarities and differences between Canadians and Americans, we had limited space to explore a wide array of issues. As a result, we included just three questions about the United States on the world stage.

The first question we asked was whether Canadians agree or disagree that “Most of the time the U.S. can be trusted to treat Canadian concerns fairly.” Canadians are divided on that question, a bare majority (51%) do not believe the U.S. can be trusted to treat Canadian concerns fairly while almost as many (46%) disagree. Few Canadians are undecided about this basic orientation towards the United States.

The fundamental differences on this question are regional and linguistic. A majority of Ontarians agree (54%) the U.S. can be trusted as do an even larger number of Atlantic Canadians (68%). Two out of three Quebecois (66%) do not trust the U.S. to provide fair treatment of Canadian concerns. Similarly, a bare majority of 50% of Anglophones trust the United States while 60% of Francophones disagree.

An interesting question for follow-up is why do Canadians tend not to trust the U.S. to consider Canadian interests fairly. Is it just the natural reaction of any one country to another? Is Canada just not on the radar screen? Or are American motives darker?




Figure 8 - Views Of America

The second question was inspired by a section of Jennifer Welsh's book, *At Home in the World*, entitled A Rogue Superpower. We asked Canadians to agree or disagree with the statement "The U.S. is behaving like a rogue nation – rushing into conflicts without attempting to first find solutions by working with its friends and allies."

Almost four out of five (79%) Canadians provide a strong endorsement of this point of view. A majority of 54% strongly agree with this statement. The Bush administration doctrine of pre-emptive actions with or without multilateral sanction does not find a receptive audience in Canada.

There are a number of significant differences among various demographic groups. Canadians under 55 are more than 10 percentage points more likely to agree with this statement than Canadians over 55. Women are 8 points more likely to agree than men. Men and women in the workforce are 10 or more percentage points more likely to agree than those outside the workforce. Francophones are 7 points more likely to agree than Anglophones. The West joins Quebec in being 7 points more likely to agree than Ontario or the Atlantic.

This point of view is not driven by ignorance. People who could answer all the knowledge questions are 9 points higher than average to agree.

Finally, we have reprised a question asked in the spring as part of the Dominion Institute's Youth Vote survey, "Do Canadians believe the U.S. is a force for good or evil in the world?"




Figure 9 - U.S.: Force For Good Or Evil

Despite the disagreement Canadians have with the current American style of international engagement, more Canadians believe the U.S. is a force for good rather than a force for evil. While a healthy plurality of 44% of Canadians see the U.S. as a force for good, a third (33%) believe the U.S. is a force for evil. It is interesting to note that with 19% don't know, Canadian adults are much more ambivalent on this question than Canadian teens. Only 11% of Canadian teens were uncertain, with most of the difference in the force for evil category.

As we saw in the teen survey, younger Canadians in this survey are also more likely to say the U.S. is a force for evil. In fact, more Canadians under 35 say the U.S. is a force for evil (45%) than say it is a force for good (38%).

Men (48%) are more likely to say the U.S. is a force for good than women (39%) who are more undecided. Upper income Canadians are more likely to say the U.S. is a force for good (51%) while a plurality of lower income Canadians say it is a force for evil (42%). Ontario (49%) and the Atlantic (55%) are more likely than average to say force for good; Quebec (39%) and the West (37%) are more likely than average to say force for evil. People who come from families who have been in Canada two generations or more are more likely to say force for good (46%) over force for evil (21%)

On this question, knowledge works for the U.S. The most informed Canadians strongly believe the U.S. is a force for good (54%), not evil (21%).

Attitudes Regarding Projecting Canadian Values

It has been a fundamental assumption in Canadian foreign policy that promoting Canadian values throughout the world is a good thing. Again, this is a topic worth more questions than we had room for, so we chose to challenge the assumption with two tests.

First, we took the perspective of critics who challenge the “boy scout imperialism” of those who assume we know better than other countries and asked Canadian’s to agree or disagree that “It is wrong for any country, even Canada, to push its values on other countries.” Second, we got specific with an example of one of the policies we could promote in the world and asked Canadians to agree or disagree that “Canada should promote the way we treat our aboriginal peoples as an example to the rest of the world.”

Canadians are wide open to the perspective of the values sceptics. Not only do 79% agree it is wrong to push values on other countries, 54% strongly agree.




Figure 10 - Promoting Canadian Values

Despite the agreement with the value sceptic point of view, a majority of 54% support promoting the way we treat our aboriginal peoples as an example for the rest of the world. Just under four in ten (39%) disagree.

On this issue there are significant differences between demographic groups. First generation Canadians (70%) and Atlantic Canadians (78%) are most likely to agree. While 58% of women agree with this statement, only agreement falls to 50% among men. The most opposed are Canadians with higher incomes (50%) and those with the greatest knowledge (53%).

Again, this is a topic that begs follow-up. Do people oppose promoting our approach to indigenous people because they oppose promoting values or because they think our approach is wrong?

Attitudes Regarding Changing Times

We asked two further questions about underlying attitudes. The first question deals with the role of the military in international affairs, “In the world today, power still comes primarily from the barrel of a gun.” The second question looks at the impact of the changing demographic face of Canada on its foreign policy by asking “Now that Canada’s rapidly changing population is more Asian than ever before, should Canada pay more attention to significant Asian countries like India and China?”

Canadians are almost divided on the role of military power in the international stage with 48% agreeing that power still comes from the barrel of a gun and 48% disagreeing. Upper income Canadians are more likely to disagree (59%) than average, as are Westerners (54%). Quebecois are more likely than average to agree (53%).




Figure 11 - Changing Times

A bare majority of 51% agree that now that Canada’s population is more Asian, we should pay more attention to Asian countries. However, a significant 44% disagree.

Supporters of this shift are more likely to be people with high levels of knowledge (65%), Francophones (59%), Quebecois (58%) and Westerners (54%) and people with high interest in international affairs (54%). People who disagree tend to be from Ontario (51%), the big generation (49%) and people from families that have been in Canada more than two generations (48%).

5. Visions of the future

Canada is at a crossroads when it comes to its foreign policy direction. Later this fall, the federal government will release its foreign policy review. Given the role of foreign and military issues in the election and the current minority situation, the opposition parties may well make this topic a major issue for debate.

As we have seen in the engagement section, while Canadians are hardly overburdened with knowledge about foreign affairs, they have a high level of interest. The challenge for the government is that the submarine fire has both renewed Canadians interest in the government's approach and left them more skeptical about it.

A key focus of this study is to develop some sense of where Canadians stand as they look at Canada's foreign policies options. In preparing for this survey we received a series of background documents from the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute and the Carleton Centre for Security and Defence Studies. We were also fortunate that the timing of the survey coincided with the launch of a new book by Jennifer Welsh entitled "At Home in the World". In this book, Welsh tightly summarizes six contending visions for Canada's foreign policy. The visions include:

- Why Not Be Switzerland
- Foreign Policy as Canada-U.S. Relations
- Foreign Policy as Trade Policy
- Reliving the Glory Days
- Canada: The New Norway
- A Foreign Policy of "Soft" Power

We developed statements based on that summary to see where Canadians stand. However, it is important to note that while the Welsh book inspired a number of the specific statements in the survey, we could not include all the arguments she covered and she in no way bears any responsibility of the choices we made.

For the first vision, Why Not Be Switzerland, we created question B3 by paraphrasing the first paragraph of Welsh's summary as follows: "Canada should be more like Switzerland and focus on being a great place to live rather than working on international issues."

The second vision, Foreign Policy as Canada-U.S. Relations, is summarized in item B4; "The best way we can make a difference in the world is to focus on our ability to influence the United States."

The third vision, Foreign Policy as Trade Policy, is highlighted in question B5, "Given how important trade is to Canada's economy, protecting our trade relationships should be our top our foreign policy priority."

The fourth vision, Reliving the Glory Days, required two items. The first question, B7, determines whether respondents see the past as all that glorious or not, "Canada has played an important role in critical world events over the past 75 years" was reported on in the Looking Back portion of section 3. The second question, then asks: "We should spend what it takes to be the international power we used to be, even if it means doing without things we would like in areas like health and education." This second question builds on a previous DIC poll released on Remembrance Day of 2002 cited by Welsh that showed a clear limit to the amount the public is prepared to pay for defence.

Question B9, "In the world today, power still comes primarily from the barrel of a gun" was inspired by Welsh's discussion around Reliving the Glory Days, but really provides more of an alternatives to Foreign Policy as Trade Policy or as an unique factor all to itself.

The fifth vision, Canada: The New Norway, was tested using B10, "Canada should focus its international involvement on helping other countries resolves their conflicts and stop trying to do so many other things."

The sixth and final vision included in Welsh's summary of existing visions is A Foreign Policy of "Soft" Power. That approach is summarized in item B11, "Canada should focus its international efforts on working with non-governmental organizations to build support for specific solutions to key problems, like the ban on landmines, and not try and do so many other things"




Figure 12 - Visions Of Canada In The World

Foreign policy as trade policy and soft power receive widespread support from Canadians. Three out of four Canadians agree that “Given how important trade is to Canada’s economy, protecting our trade relationships should be our top our foreign policy priority” while just under seven in ten agree “Canada should focus its international efforts on working with non-governmental organizations to build support for specific solutions to key problems, like the ban on landmines, and not try and do so many other things.”

Foreign policy as trade policy receives stronger than average support from the big generation (81%) who are currently in mid-career and working women (78%). Those most likely to disagree with this approach include people with the highest knowledge levels (41%), those who are most interested in international affairs (28%), people under 35 (29%), higher income families (29%) and those from Ontario (23%).

Soft power is broadly accepted across demographic groups. Higher income Canadians are a little more resistant (32% disagree) while Francophones are more supportive than average (75% agree).

In contrast, Canadians are fairly evenly divided on three other vision statements. A narrow majority of 53% supports The New Norway statement while narrow majorities of 52% each oppose the ideas of Why Not Be Switzerland and Foreign Policy as Canada-U.S. Relations.

The New Norway visions finds more than average support among Quebecois (65%), Francophones (64%) and those with high levels of interest (56%).

Groups such as lower income Canadians (51%), Quebecois (55%), Francophones (51%) and those with low knowledge levels (58%) are more likely than average to say "Why Not Be Switzerland."

There is a big gender gap in support for Foreign Policy as Canada-U.S. Relations. Men are evenly divided with 48% supporting that vision and 48% opposing it. At 52%, working men are among the strongest supporters. Among women, 56% are opposed while only 38% support the policy.

Quebecois (55%) and Francophones (55%) are supportive of focusing on the U.S. The least knowledgeable respondents are some of the most likely to disagree with this approach (60%).

Canadians fundamentally rejected just one vision statement. Four out of five (81%) of Canadians reject the idea "We should spend what it takes to be the international power we used to be, even if it means doing without things we would like in areas like health and education." While Canadians agree Canada has played an important role in the past, there is a clear limit to how much sacrifice Canadians are prepared to make to return to that level of commitment.

At 28% agreement, New Canadians are one of the most likely groups to support this vision. Francophones (23%) and men (23%) and women (23%) who are not working are also more likely to agree with this approach.

Looking at the overall reactions to these competing visions, we see a mixed story. While we can only begin to draw conclusion based on single statement measure of complex visions, it is very interesting to see Canadians strongly embrace both the interest-based approach of foreign policy as trade relations and the values-based approach of soft power. However, whether the government adopts an interest-based approach or a values-based approach, it does so knowing Canadians do not appear to be prepared to sacrifice domestic priorities for the greater international good.

6. Threats

The threats section was inspired by a long-term series of questions run by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations in their Quadrennial Study of U.S. public opinion on Foreign Policy. Five items are from the 2004 study. One of the five tracking items is slightly changed. Where the original survey asked Americans about AIDS, the Ebola Virus and other potential epidemics, we replaced Ebola with SARS. The sixth item – globalization – was asked in 2002 and those results are used in our charts. The link to the CCFR site is <http://www.ccfcr.org/>.

The seven concerns tested break into two basic groups. Three concerns evoke significant concern from a majority of Canadians – potential epidemics, global warming and international terrorism. The other four concerns – globalization, Islamic fundamentalism, immigrants and refugees and U.S. aggression towards Canada raise far less concern.




Figure 13 – Canadian Assessments Of International Threats

There is no overall pattern of differences among Canadians. No particular groups are systematically more or less concerned about this list of international threats. There are, however, some specific reactions worth noting.

Canadians over 55 years old are more likely than average to be concerned about Islamic fundamentalism, international terrorism and large numbers of immigrants and refugees. All three of these measures may be linked by an underlying orientation towards 'Outgroups'. While we ran out of room in the survey to include such measures, it would be an interesting theme to pursue in future studies. The differences here are not huge – older Canadians are no more than 10 percent higher than average on these measures - but it is a picture consistent with the idea that as younger Canadians grow

up in a more cosmopolitan Canada, they grow more accepting of other cultures than older generations who grew raised in a more homogenous country.

Quebecois and Francophones are generally more concerned about globalization. Again, the differences are significant but not overwhelming. Quebecois and Francophones are roughly nine points higher than average in assessing globalizations as a critical threat.

Young Canadians under 35 are somewhat more likely to express concern over globalization (33% critical). Consistent with the stereotypes, under 35s (at 60%) and members of the big generation (55%) are also much more likely to say global warming is a critical threat than people over 55 (37%).

Finally, women (65%) and particularly non-working women (69%) who are mostly seniors or care-givers at home are more likely than potential epidemics are a critical threat than other caregivers.




Figure 14 - Canadian versus American Assessments Of International Threats

Canadians and Americans tend to view international threats very differently.

Americans and Canadians are alike in their views of the high degree of threat they perceive is presented by disease and the low degree of threat they see coming from globalization. But the similarities stop there.

Americans are 16 percent higher than Canadians in rating Islamic fundamentalism as a critical threat, 26 percent higher than Canadians in rating international terrorism as a critical threat and 31% percent higher than Canadians in rating large numbers of immigrants and refugees as a critical threat.

Meanwhile Canadians are 15 points higher in their rating of global warming as a critical threat.

These differences complicate life between neighbours. When two countries view their external threats so differently, it can be hard to find common ground.

Yet it is possible to exaggerate the implications of these differences. In both countries the issues broke into a clear first and second tier. And two of the three issues on both countries top tiers are the same – potential epidemics and international terrorism. So while our absolute level of concern may differ, our relative priorities are fairly similar.

7. Willingness to use force

Where do Canadians really stand in their willingness to use the military as an active tool of foreign policy? Earlier in the report we looked at Canadian reaction to the statement “In the world today, power still comes primarily from the barrel of a gun.” But we were still interested in a more detailed understanding of the issue.

One of the challenges in public opinion over the military is the difficulty in engaging the public in a discussion about the military is the public’s enthusiasm for peacekeeping. It is by no means clear the public has any real understanding of the differences between peacekeeping and peacemaking. We wanted to see if we could look at the issue with fresh eyes.

Once again, we found a useful set of questions originating from the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations Quadrennial Study of U.S. public opinion on Foreign Policy. In 2002, this was asked not only in the U.S., but in six European countries as well. The link to the CCFR site is <http://www.ccfrr.org/>.




Figure 15 - Canadian Views On When To Use Troops

Canadians are overwhelmingly ready to commit troops in most of the scenarios we tested. Even the least popular reason for committing troops – securing the supply of oil – enjoys more support (47%) than opposition (45%).

Assisting a population struck by famine clearly heads the hit parade of reasons to commit troops with over nine in ten supporting the use of the military in that scenario. Sending the Canadian Forces to uphold international laws not only wins 84% overall support, but also by 55% strong support.

Bringing peace in a civil war, liberating hostages and destroying a terrorist camp all enjoy support levels in the 70 percent level with strong support around 45%.

There are some clear demographic patterns in the results. Atlantic Canadians are generally more supportive of the use of troops. Canadians with higher incomes and greater knowledge are also more supportive of committing troops, except when it comes to securing oil where they are more likely to oppose the use of troops.

Working women are more likely to commit troops to help people suffering with famine and less likely to support an attack on a terrorist base.

New Canadians and, to a lesser extent, second generation Canadians are less likely to support the use of Canadian troops in most circumstances.




Figure 16 – Canadian Versus U.S. Views On When To Use Troops

Canadians are not all that different than Americans in their willingness to use troops. In fact, the biggest single difference between the two countries is that Canadians are 31 percentage points more likely to support the use of Canadian troops to bring peace to a region where there is civil war. This may well be due to the fact the Americans have very real and painful experience taking on exactly this task in places like Somalia and Beirut.

Canadians are also more likely to support sending their troops to assist a population struck by famine and to uphold international law.

Americans are 19 percentage points more likely to support using their troops to destroy a terrorist camp and 18 percentage points more likely to support using troops to secure the supply of oil.

Americans and Canadians are equally committed to sending troops to liberate hostages.

It appears the main difference between Americans and Canadians when it comes to committing troops is not Canadian commitment but Canadian capability.

	To ensure the supply of oil	To destroy a terrorist camp	To liberate hostages	To bring peace in a civil war	To uphold international law	To assist a population struck by famine
US	65%	92%	77%	48%	76%	81%
Canada	47%	73%	78%	79%	84%	92%
Great Britain	61%	84%	82%	75%	84%	90%
France	46%	84%	83%	76%	84%	89%
Germany	40%	62%	69%	58%	68%	83%
The Netherlands	47%	70%	80%	73%	86%	93%
Italy	51%	75%	83%	85%	83%	91%
Poland	52%	75%	78%	71%	84%	92%

Table 1 – International Views on the Use of Troops

Canada and the U.S. are by no means international exceptions when it comes to willingness to use troops among advanced industrial democracies. Great Britain, France and Italy all follow the same pattern, but are slightly more likely to be willing to commit troops on average than Canada and the U.S.

Poland and the Netherlands are quite close to Canada, perhaps sharing sensibilities as middle powers.

Only Germany stands out as distinct. While a majority of Germans would commit troops for most purposes other than ensuring the oil supply, on average Germans are 10 percentage points less likely to support the use of troops than the U.S. or its European peers.

8. Choices

To wrap up the survey, we asked Canadians to weigh in on four choices that will confront policy makers in the near future. We included questions to cover all three topics of defence, development and diplomacy including:

1. Should Canada limit its military commitments to instances when Canadian lives and interests are directly at stake, or should we commit troops even when Canadian interests are not at risk;
2. Should Canada spread its foreign aid around to all the countries in need or focus on fewer countries to make a bigger difference;
3. In terms of Canada's multilateral efforts, should Canada retain its focus on the UN or shift to more local and regional vehicles; and
4. Should Canada spend incremental diplomatic resources on expanding our presence in multilateral organization or by expanding our presence in countries that are particularly important to Canada?

Military Commitments

As might be expected given Canadian responses to specific troop commitment scenarios, a majority of Canadians support committing the military even when Canadian lives and interest are not directly at stake. However, when we specifically evoke the potential for lives to be lost, support for committing troops in this scenario (53%) is far below the results seen in the previous scenario such as sending troops to provide peace in a civil war or to aid a population dealing with famine.




Figure 17 - Views On Committing The Military

Lower income Canadians (49%), those with the least amount of knowledge (45%) and men (44%), especially working men (48%) are the most likely to oppose sending Canadian troops unless there is a direct threat to Canada. Higher income Canadians

(68%) and those with the most knowledge (67%) are most likely to favour sending troops even if there is no direct interest at stake.

Foreign Aid

A bare majority of 51% Canadians believe we should focus foreign aid spending on a smaller group of countries for bigger effect rather than spreading aid around to all the countries in need to be fair.




Figure 18 - Foreign Aid Spending

Canadians under 25 (47%) and from the Atlantic provinces (60%) are most likely to favour spreading aid among all the countries that need it.

The one group that stands out as more supportive than average to focus foreign aid spending on fewer countries are the Canadians who know the most about foreign affairs (69%).

Diplomacy: Focus on UN or Regionally

As the CAII study earlier this year showed, Canadians remain big fans of the UN. In developing this question, we understood that most Canadians would know relatively little about multilateral institutions, so we did our best to present two sides of the argument as compellingly as possible.

One position stated, "The United Nations is no longer as effective as it used to be. Interventions in places like Kosovo and East Timor happened outside the UN. The UN failed to authorize its mission in Rwanda to act in time to save thousands of people from slaughter. They argue that Canada should focus less on the UN and more on local and regional ways of dealing with problems."

The other position argued, "The current problems in Iraq are a good example of what can happen when countries act without United Nations support. They say maintaining Canada's focus on the UN and its agencies like UNICEF and the World Health Organization are the best way Canada can make a difference in the world."

Consistent with previous work, Canadians chose the UN perspective by a wide margin, 70% to 27% for the alternative approach.




Figure 19 - Focus on UN or Shift to Regions

Canadians with higher incomes (78%), men who are not working (77%) and Quebecois (77%) are more likely to say Canada should maintain its focus on the UN.

Canadians with little interest in international affairs (48%) or low knowledge (55%) are the most likely to say focus more on other institutions.

Diplomacy: Focus on Multilateral Organizations or Important Countries

Canadians are evenly divided on the choice, 47% for expanding our focus in foreign countries and 46% for expanding our presence in international organizations.




Figure 20 - International Diplomacy

There are some unique splits on this issue. Working men and non-working men are on opposing sides of this issue. Working men support focusing on important countries by 54% while non-working men favour focusing on international organizations by 55%.

Quebecois (55%) are more likely to support expanding Canada's international presence while Ontarians favour focusing on important countries (53%).

The most knowledgeable Canadians favour focusing on important countries (56%) over expanding our international presence (34%).